Attackers Didn’t Wait for AI. They Built Workflows Around It.
ATT&CK techniques detected
T1608.006SEO Poisoning
68%
“there, too. instead of inventing something new, they ’ re scaling what already works : seo poisoning, malvertising, and convincing download pages placed exactly where users expect to find legitimate tools. in one case, a huntress engineer searched for “ claude code ” and clicked …”
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T1586.002Email Accounts
68%
“reusable templates that get flagged by email filters, attackers generate messages tailored to each target, aligned to roles, tools, organizations, and workflows. for example, both the b2b sender and capture link products in eviltokens support ai workflows that help bypass email f…”
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T1566.002Spearphishing Link
47%
“it never turned into a full incident thanks to a fast security operations center ( soc ) response. but this story is a clear example that attackers are inserting themselves directly into ai adoption. when “ helpful ” ai answers become the attack the next step isn ’ t just getting…”
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T1566.002Spearphishing Link
39%
“reusable templates that get flagged by email filters, attackers generate messages tailored to each target, aligned to roles, tools, organizations, and workflows. for example, both the b2b sender and capture link products in eviltokens support ai workflows that help bypass email f…”
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