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Black Hills InfoSec

Abusing Delegation with Impacket (Part 2): Constrained Delegation

BHIS · 2025-11-12 · Read original ↗

ATT&CK techniques detected

31 predictions
T1003.006DCSync
85%
“dcsync against dc01 as administrator impacket - secretsdump - k dc01. secure. local 3. live machine spn hijacking with genericwrite spn hijacking is an edge - case technique where, if the conditions line up, an attacker with permissions to modify a target ’ s spns can effectively…”
T1558.003Kerberoasting
77%
“local ). 1. find machine - based constrained delegation with protocol transition ( pc01 $ to host / dc01. secure. local ) impacket - finddelegation ' secure. local / kcduser ' : ' password2 @ ' - dc - ip 10. 0. 1. 200 2. using pc01 $ ’ s ntlm hash, we can obtain a service ticket …”
T1550.003Pass the Ticket
70%
“an elevated user. - pass that forwardable ticket ( with an additional s4u2proxy ) to the service the compromised resource is allowed to delegate to. 1. add a user spn and machine account, reflective rbcd assume we ’ ve compromised the user kcduser with the password password2 @, w…”
T1550.003Pass the Ticket
69%
“compromised host is allowed to delegate to. a quick aside, the reason why maq comes in handy is because computer accounts always have spns tied to them by default. however, if maq is disabled, the same can be done if an attacker controls a user with an spn or has the permission t…”
T1550.003Pass the Ticket
64%
“' - - spn ' host / pc01. secure. local ' 10. 0. 1. 200 11. verify all spns are restored on dc01 $ and pc01 $ python3 addspn. py - u secure. localdacluser - p ' password3 # ' - t ' pc01 $ ' 10. 0. 1. 200 - q python3 addspn. py - u secure. localdacluser - p ' password3 # ' - t ' dc…”
T1558Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
58%
“9f44 - e1453be7af5a - https : / / shenaniganslabs. io / 2019 / 01 / 28 / wagging - the - dog. html # a - forwardable - result - https : / / www. thehacker. recipes / ad / movement / kerberos / delegations / constrained - https : / / sqlmastersconsulting. com. au / sql - server - …”
T1098Account Manipulation
53%
“- > dc01 ) impacket - getst - impersonate ' administrator ' - spn ' host / dc01. secure. local ' - additional - ticket administrator @ [ email protected ] - dc - ip 10. 0. 1. 200 - hashes ' aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee : 8d67f5a634a447bee65785be5c49b2a4 ' ' secure. local / pc…”
T1558Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
52%
“compromised host is allowed to delegate to. a quick aside, the reason why maq comes in handy is because computer accounts always have spns tied to them by default. however, if maq is disabled, the same can be done if an attacker controls a user with an spn or has the permission t…”
T1558Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
51%
“abusing delegation with impacket ( part 2 ) : constrained delegation abusing delegation with impacket ( part 2 ) : constrained delegation hunter recently graduated with his master ’ s degree in cyber defense and has over two years of experience in penetration testing. his favorit…”
T1558.001Golden Ticket
47%
“3. configure pc01 $ to trust machine $ for delegation impacket - rbcd - delegate - from ' machine $ ' - delegate - to ' pc01 $ ' - dc - ip 10. 0. 1. 200 - action ' write ' - hashes ' aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee : 8d67f5a634a447bee65785be5c49b2a4 ' ' secure. local / pc01 $ ' …”
T1550.003Pass the Ticket
47%
“##404eeaad3b435b51404ee : 16f2bd968f2885a410873b4efa104527 ' ' secure. local / administrator ' conclusion while constrained delegation offers improvements in limiting risk compared to its dangerous unconstrained counterpart, if a resource configured with constrained delegation is…”
T1558.001Golden Ticket
46%
“host / pc01. secure. local spn to dc01 $ python3 addspn. py - u secure. localdacluser - p ' password3 # ' - t ' dc01 $ ' - - spn ' host / pc01. secure. local ' 10. 0. 1. 200 5. using pc02 $ ’ s ntlm hash, obtain a service ticket as the domain administrator to host / pc01. secure.…”
T1558Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
44%
“##andu2proxy - a - low - dive - into - kerberos - delegations / - https : / / mayfly277. github. io / posts / goadv2 - pwning - part10 / - https : / / shenaniganslabs. io / 2019 / 01 / 28 / wagging - the - dog. html - https : / / www. tiraniddo. dev / 2022 / 05 / exploiting - rbc…”
T1558.003Kerberoasting
43%
“u secure. localkcduser - p ' password2 @ ' - s host / kcd. secure. local - - target - type samname 10. 0. 1. 200 - r 2. s4u2self and s4u2proxy with machine ntlm hash assume we ’ ve compromised the machine pc01 $ with the ntlm hash aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee : 8d67f5a634a447…”
T1558.003Kerberoasting
41%
“##rarily write spns among other things. this means, with the permissions we have, we can migrate pc01 ’ s host / pc01. secure. local spn to dc01, essentially making dc01 the target for delegation. then, if we perform s4u2self and s4u2proxy, we can obtain a service ticket as an el…”
T1558Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
40%
“3. configure pc01 $ to trust machine $ for delegation impacket - rbcd - delegate - from ' machine $ ' - delegate - to ' pc01 $ ' - dc - ip 10. 0. 1. 200 - action ' write ' - hashes ' aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee : 8d67f5a634a447bee65785be5c49b2a4 ' ' secure. local / pc01 $ ' …”
T1558.001Golden Ticket
39%
“and s4u2proxy. there are two types of constrained delegation – with and without protocol transition. the key difference is how the impersonation is done. - constrained with protocol transition : uses s4u2self to impersonate users and s4u2proxy to generate a service ticket to the …”
T1550.003Pass the Ticket
39%
“s4u2self and s4u2proxy with username and password assume we ’ ve compromised the user kcduser with the password password2 @, which is allowed to delegate to host / dc01. secure. local, being the domain controller. to escalate in the domain, since protocol transition is enabled, w…”
T1558.001Golden Ticket
39%
“' - - spn ' host / pc01. secure. local ' 10. 0. 1. 200 11. verify all spns are restored on dc01 $ and pc01 $ python3 addspn. py - u secure. localdacluser - p ' password3 # ' - t ' pc01 $ ' 10. 0. 1. 200 - q python3 addspn. py - u secure. localdacluser - p ' password3 # ' - t ' dc…”
T1550.003Pass the Ticket
38%
“to delegate to host / dc01. secure. local, being the domain controller. to escalate in the domain, since protocol transition is disabled, we can obtain a forwardable service ticket through reflective resource based constrained delegation ( maq + rbcd ). 1. find machine - based co…”
T1550.003Pass the Ticket
37%
“3. configure pc01 $ to trust machine $ for delegation impacket - rbcd - delegate - from ' machine $ ' - delegate - to ' pc01 $ ' - dc - ip 10. 0. 1. 200 - action ' write ' - hashes ' aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee : 8d67f5a634a447bee65785be5c49b2a4 ' ' secure. local / pc01 $ ' …”
T1550.003Pass the Ticket
35%
“the question : how can we use s4u2proxy to generate a forwardable service ticket? reflective resource - based constrained delegation any user or machine in a domain, by default, can configure resource - based constrained delegation ( rbcd ) on themselves. this is essentially trad…”
T1558.001Golden Ticket
35%
“an elevated user. - pass that forwardable ticket ( with an additional s4u2proxy ) to the service the compromised resource is allowed to delegate to. 1. add a user spn and machine account, reflective rbcd assume we ’ ve compromised the user kcduser with the password password2 @, w…”
T1558.001Golden Ticket
35%
“the question : how can we use s4u2proxy to generate a forwardable service ticket? reflective resource - based constrained delegation any user or machine in a domain, by default, can configure resource - based constrained delegation ( rbcd ) on themselves. this is essentially trad…”
T1558.001Golden Ticket
35%
“s4u2self and s4u2proxy with username and password assume we ’ ve compromised the user kcduser with the password password2 @, which is allowed to delegate to host / dc01. secure. local, being the domain controller. to escalate in the domain, since protocol transition is enabled, w…”
T1558Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
34%
“to delegate to host / dc01. secure. local, being the domain controller. to escalate in the domain, since protocol transition is disabled, we can obtain a forwardable service ticket through reflective resource based constrained delegation ( maq + rbcd ). 1. find machine - based co…”
T1558Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
34%
“the question : how can we use s4u2proxy to generate a forwardable service ticket? reflective resource - based constrained delegation any user or machine in a domain, by default, can configure resource - based constrained delegation ( rbcd ) on themselves. this is essentially trad…”
T1550.003Pass the Ticket
33%
“##rarily write spns among other things. this means, with the permissions we have, we can migrate pc01 ’ s host / pc01. secure. local spn to dc01, essentially making dc01 the target for delegation. then, if we perform s4u2self and s4u2proxy, we can obtain a service ticket as an el…”
T1550.003Pass the Ticket
32%
“and s4u2proxy. there are two types of constrained delegation – with and without protocol transition. the key difference is how the impersonation is done. - constrained with protocol transition : uses s4u2self to impersonate users and s4u2proxy to generate a service ticket to the …”
T1558.003Kerberoasting
32%
“to delegate to host / dc01. secure. local, being the domain controller. to escalate in the domain, since protocol transition is disabled, we can obtain a forwardable service ticket through reflective resource based constrained delegation ( maq + rbcd ). 1. find machine - based co…”
T1558.003Kerberoasting
31%
“to host / dc01. secure. local python3 tgssub. py - in administrator @ [ email protected ] - out dc01 - ticket. ccache - altservice ' host / dc01. secure. local ' 7. export the ticket into memory export krb5ccname = dc01 - ticket. ccache 8. perform a dcsync against dc01 as adminis…”

Summary

This is the second in a three-part series of blog posts discussing how to abuse Kerberos delegation! If you haven't already, feel free to read the first blog post, as it discusses the Kerberos authentication process and how delegation plays an important role in solving the double-hop problem.

The post Abusing Delegation with Impacket (Part 2): Constrained Delegation appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..